Transparent communication of evidence does not undermine public trust in evidence.

Does clear and transparent communication of risks, benefits, and uncertainties increase or undermine public trust in scientific information that people use to guide their decision-making? We examined the impact of reframing messages written in traditional persuasive style to align instead with recent "evidence communication" principles, aiming to inform decision-making: communicating a balance of risks and benefits, disclosing uncertainties and evidence quality, and prebunking misperceptions. In two pre-registered experiments, UK participants read either a persuasive message or a balanced and informative message adhering to evidence communication recommendations about COVID-19 vaccines (Study 1) or nuclear power plants (Study 2). We find that balanced messages are either perceived as trustworthy as persuasive messages (Study 1), or more so (Study 2). However, we note a moderating role of prior beliefs such that balanced messages were consistently perceived as more trustworthy among those with negative or neutral prior beliefs about the message content. We furthermore note that participants who had read the persuasive message on nuclear power plants voiced significantly stronger support for nuclear power than those who had read the balanced message, despite rating the information as less trustworthy. There was no difference in vaccination intentions between groups reading the different vaccine messages.

COVID-19 risk perception and hoax beliefs in the US immediately before and after the announcement of President Trump's diagnosis.

A notable challenge of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has been public scepticism over the severity of the disease, or even its existence. Such scepticism is politically skewed in the USA, with conservatives more likely to downplay or deny the risks of the virus. However, the hospitalization of President Trump with COVID-19 in October 2020 served as a high-profile exemplar of the reality and risks of the virus, and as such may have influenced opinions, particularly for US conservatives. We investigate whether President Trump testing positive was associated with changes in public attitudes towards the virus. In two studies, we surveyed independent representative US samples before and after the announcement of Trump's illness. In Study 1, measuring risk perceptions of the virus, we find that participants surveyed before and after the announcement did not differ in their risk perception regardless of political orientation. In Study 2, measuring belief that the virus is a hoax, we find that among those on the far right of the political spectrum, hoax belief was lower for those surveyed after the announcement, suggesting that Trump's hospitalization may have affected the beliefs of those most receptive to the President's earlier suggestions that the virus might be a hoax.

The effects of quality of evidence communication on perception of public health information about COVID-19: Two randomised controlled trials.

BACKGROUND: The quality of evidence about the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical health interventions is often low, but little is known about the effects of communicating indications of evidence quality to the public. METHODS: In two blinded, randomised, controlled, online experiments, US participants (total n = 2140) were shown one of several versions of an infographic illustrating the effectiveness of eye protection in reducing COVID-19 transmission. Their trust in the information, understanding, feelings of effectiveness of eye protection, and the likelihood of them adopting it were measured. FINDINGS: Compared to those given no quality cues, participants who were told the quality of the evidence on eye protection was 'low', rated the evidence less trustworthy (p = .001, d = 0.25), and rated it as subjectively less effective (p = .018, d = 0.19). The same effects emerged compared to those who were told the quality of the evidence was 'high', and in one of the two studies, those shown 'low' quality of evidence said they were less likely to use eye protection (p = .005, d = 0.18). Participants who were told the quality of the evidence was 'high' showed no statistically significant differences on these measures compared to those given no information about evidence quality. CONCLUSIONS: Without quality of evidence cues, participants responded to the evidence about the public health intervention as if it was high quality and this affected their subjective perceptions of its efficacy and trust in the provided information. This raises the ethical dilemma of weighing the importance of transparently stating when the evidence base is actually low quality against evidence that providing such information can decrease trust, perception of intervention efficacy, and likelihood of adopting it.

How Accurate Are Accuracy-Nudge Interventions? A Preregistered Direct Replication of Pennycook et al. (2020).

As part of the Systematizing Confidence in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) program, the present study consisted of a two-stage replication test of a central finding by Pennycook et al. (2020), namely that asking people to think about the accuracy of a single headline improves "truth discernment" of intentions to share news headlines about COVID-19. The first stage of the replication test (n = 701) was unsuccessful (p = .67). After collecting a second round of data (additional n = 882, pooled N = 1,583), we found a small but significant interaction between treatment condition and truth discernment (uncorrected p = .017; treatment: d = 0.14, control: d = 0.10). As in the target study, perceived headline accuracy correlated with treatment impact, so that treatment-group participants were less willing to share headlines that were perceived as less accurate. We discuss potential explanations for these findings and an unreported change in the hypothesis (but not the analysis plan) from the preregistration in the original study.

How well did experts and laypeople forecast the size of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, social and traditional media have disseminated predictions from experts and nonexperts about its expected magnitude. How accurate were the predictions of 'experts'-individuals holding occupations or roles in subject-relevant fields, such as epidemiologists and statisticians-compared with those of the public? We conducted a survey in April 2020 of 140 UK experts and 2,086 UK laypersons; all were asked to make four quantitative predictions about the impact of COVID-19 by 31 Dec 2020. In addition to soliciting point estimates, we asked participants for lower and higher bounds of a range that they felt had a 75% chance of containing the true answer. Experts exhibited greater accuracy and calibration than laypersons, even when restricting the comparison to a subset of laypersons who scored in the top quartile on a numeracy test. Even so, experts substantially underestimated the ultimate extent of the pandemic, and the mean number of predictions for which the expert intervals contained the actual outcome was only 1.8 (out of 4), suggesting that experts should consider broadening the range of scenarios they consider plausible. Predictions of the public were even more inaccurate and poorly calibrated, suggesting that an important role remains for expert predictions as long as experts acknowledge their uncertainty.

Communicating personalized risks from COVID-19: guidelines from an empirical study.

As increasing amounts of data accumulate on the effects of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and the risk factors that lead to poor outcomes, it is possible to produce personalized estimates of the risks faced by groups of people with different characteristics. The challenge of how to communicate these then becomes apparent. Based on empirical work (total n = 5520, UK) supported by in-person interviews with the public and physicians, we make recommendations on the presentation of such information. These include: using predominantly percentages when communicating the absolute risk, but also providing, for balance, a format which conveys a contrasting (higher) perception of risk (expected frequency out of 10 000); using a visual linear scale cut at an appropriate point to illustrate the maximum risk, explained through an illustrative 'persona' who might face that highest level of risk; and providing context to the absolute risk through presenting a range of other 'personas' illustrating people who would face risks of a wide range of different levels. These 'personas' should have their major risk factors (age, existing health conditions) described. By contrast, giving people absolute likelihoods of other risks they face in an attempt to add context was considered less helpful. We note that observed effect sizes generally were small. However, even small effects are meaningful and relevant when scaled up to population levels.

Susceptibility to misinformation about COVID-19 around the world.

Misinformation about COVID-19 is a major threat to public health. Using five national samples from the UK (n = 1050 and n = 1150), Ireland (n = 700), the USA (n = 700), Spain (n = 700) and Mexico (n = 700), we examine predictors of belief in the most common statements about the virus that contain misinformation. We also investigate the prevalence of belief in COVID-19 misinformation across different countries and the role of belief in such misinformation in predicting relevant health behaviours. We find that while public belief in misinformation about COVID-19 is not particularly common, a substantial proportion views this type of misinformation as highly reliable in each country surveyed. In addition, a small group of participants find common factual information about the virus highly unreliable. We also find that increased susceptibility to misinformation negatively affects people's self-reported compliance with public health guidance about COVID-19, as well as people's willingness to get vaccinated against the virus and to recommend the vaccine to vulnerable friends and family. Across all countries surveyed, we find that higher trust in scientists and having higher numeracy skills were associated with lower susceptibility to coronavirus-related misinformation. Taken together, these results demonstrate a clear link between susceptibility to misinformation and both vaccine hesitancy and a reduced likelihood to comply with health guidance measures, and suggest that interventions which aim to improve critical thinking and trust in science may be a promising avenue for future research.